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Abstract. This paper addresses the waves of mass killings recently perpetrated by individuals 
with a weak or nonexistent ideological motivation, whose acts either appear to contradict their 
purported political cause or are admittedly driven by a quest for notoriety. Examples range 
from killers who have been waging jihad against European Jews to unattached mass killers 
such as the Germanwings pilot to the perpetrators of mass school shootings in America and 
worldwide. We argue that these phenomena can be understood as instances of the Herostratos 
syndrome, which has been known for thousands of years as characterizing the behavior of 
people who seek to survive in the collective memory by excelling in their infamous acts. We 
provide a model of hybrid killers which accommodates the Herostratic motive alongside a 
political motive and characterize a well-behaved Nash equilibrium where Herostratic killers 
are competing with one another with a view to make a name for themselves in infamy. The 
policy implications point toward reducing the publicity the killers enjoy, thus frustrating their 
quest for notoriety.  
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 1. Introduction 
 
Although Mohamed Merah, Mehdi Nemmouche and Amedy Coulibali have claimed 
to kill in the name of Global Jihad, they have indulged in the deliberate killing of Jews in 
Toulouse, Brussels and Paris respectively. The main impact of such killing of Jewish civilians 
in Western Europe is to provide many others with an incentive to perform their Alya, i.e. to 
migrate to Israel. According to some estimates by Jewish organizations close to the Israeli 
Embassy in Paris, several hundred French families have thus migrated to Israel in the wake of 
these killings of Jews in France and Belgium above the normal trend after Merah’s 2012 
attack at the Ozar Hatorah school in Toulouse. In 2015 alone, 7,900 French Jews have thus 
migrated to Israel. This is precisely the opposite effect to what Hamas and Hezbollah are 
trying to achieve by running their very costly campaigns of mortar shelling inside Israel or of 
suicide attacks against Israelis. Their aim is to maintain in Israel a sustained level of 
insecurity high enough to either discourage Jewish immigration there or even to convince 
some Israeli citizens to migrate abroad, to Europe or the US, in order to escape from that 
insecurity. Even the most devoted Zionists cannot hope to trigger so many Alyas even by 
investing large sums of money for helping migrants as the three French Muslim killers have 
done. Although it is too early to provide any estimate at the time of writing, it is likely that the 
November 2015 lethal attacks in Paris will have a similar impact, although they did not target 
Jews specifically. Still, the Bataclan theater, where more than 100 people were gunned down, 
is located quite close to an area where many Jews are known to live and to run a lot of 
fashionable shops. Hezbollah’s leader Hasan Nasrallah has even formally condemned some of 
the recent terrorist attacks in France, saying on January 9, 2015, that “extremists have done 
more harm to Islam than cartoons”, as well as other attacks outside the Middle East on other 
occasions ever since 9/11. 
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This seeming strategic inconsistency puts out a challenge to the rational-choice 
theorist, echoed in the media using expressions like “brainwashing”, “radicalization”, etc. to 
“explain” this seemingly irrational behavior. Rational-choice theory would instead take 
rationality of the actors as an untestable postulate and would use revealed preference theory to 
try and decipher the agenda hidden behind the apparent contradictions between the political 
claims voiced by these killers or their entourage and the predictable outcomes of their acts. 
The present paper – a substantial extension of a previous note1 – explores how the so-
called “Herostratos Syndrome” (Borowitz, 2005) can actually help us to answer the question 
of what these killers really sought to maximize when they launched their attacks against 
European Jews despite their highly predictable negative consequences for the Palestinian 
cause. This syndrome has been known for more than two millennia and refers to killers and 
arsonists who perpetrate odious attacks for the sake of self-glorification. We argue that this 
type of motivation has a much broader domain of application than just Global Jihad, as 
Western countries have witnessed recently many other violent and spectacular attacks that 
seem to aim just at making a name for the killers. There is a wide diversity of killers, whose 
self-proclaimed objectives blend in different proportions some claims to fight for major 
ideological causes, ranging from Global Jihad to White Supremacy (like Anders Breivik who 
in July 2011 massacred 77 people in Norway, most of whom, paradoxically, were white kids) 
to Marxism-Leninism (like the notorious Carlos the Jackal in the 20th century, who turned 
coat many times), with an obvious quest for celebrity. Hence, there might be another driver 
behind these terrorist attacks than just political causes. This diversity is accommodated in the 
model below by assuming hybrid motivations for the potential terrorists, where the 
Herostratos syndrome and the devotion to some cause may come in various proportions. The 
                                                 
1
 A very short presentation of our approach, including a brief description of the model and its policy 
implications, was published in the proceedings of the 16th Jan Tinbergen European Peace Science Conference 
(Azam and Ferrero, 2016). The present paper analyzes the full model with all the different cases (including the 
possibility of multiple equilibria), elaborates on its policy implications in detail, and addresses a broad variety of 
historical and current applications as a testing ground.   
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benefit of embedding this hypothesis within such a model of hybrid killers is that many other 
potential applications come to mind to explain many other kinds of lethal attacks that are 
routinely observed all around the planet, be they self-proclaimed terrorist or otherwise. For 
example, many insurgencies invest in bombing pipelines, which often entails massive 
irreversible environmental damage, something that seems to contradict their claim to be 
working to enhance the welfare of their folks and their descendants. Similarly the massacre of 
more than a thousand Muslims in the Indian state of Gujarat in 2002 was perpetrated under 
the aegis of the Hindu right (Nussbaum, 2007) although it was bound to trigger an increased 
support among Indian Muslims for the Global Jihad movement harbored by neighboring and 
rival Pakistan. The subsequent Mumbai killings then came as a deadly echo in 2008. 
An additional layer of strategic inconsistency seems to challenge the rational choice 
theorist because some Islamist organizations seem to support this type of attacks within a 
Global Jihad framework. This is the case of the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), 
whose leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi has made violent declarations justifying the killing of 
Jews wherever they are. This indiscriminate anti-Semitic view finds also some support in the 
popular apocalyptic literature that flourished in Egypt and some other Middle Eastern 
countries (Filiu, 2011). In a typical apocalyptic fashion, some authors argue that strengthening 
the state of Israel would hasten the day of the final battle where Islam will crush the 
Byzantine army, i.e., the Christian Zionist powers. After thoroughly reviewing this literature, 
Filiu concludes (tongue in cheek): “Generally speaking, inhabitants of the West Bank and 
Gaza seemed less fond of apocalyptic imaginings than people in neighboring countries” 
(Filiu, 2011, p.135). We argue instead that this position is part of a rational strategy aimed at 
leveraging the Herostratos syndrome to recruit more Jihadists by offering an alternative, 
media-intensive communication network. In such a network, the new recruits are bound to 
reach instant infamous stardom for their participation in gory videos, where beheadings and 
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other blood shedding acts are broadcasted online world-wide (Kepel, 2015, Nesser, 2015, 
Stern and Berger, 2015). Hence, behind the cover of a grand plan for apocalyptic Jihad, ISIS 
leadership is probably also advocating indiscriminate Jews killing as an additional incentive 
for individual European killers to join their cause as a shortcut to celebrity.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section looks at some 
related literature, while section 3 reviews some empirical material, both historical and 
contemporary, that substantiates the Herostratos syndrome. Section 4 presents the model and 
section 5 works out its comparative statics to draw policy implications. The last section 
concludes. 
 
2. Literature 
 
The problem addressed in this paper – competition for infamy – seems to be 
unexplored in the economics and rational-choice literature. There are, however, two fields of 
research that are germane to it, though at some remove. One is the study of the supply side of 
suicide terrorism: the motivation of individuals willing to sacrifice their lives and their 
decision-making calculus. These individuals, however, are generally motivated by an 
ideology or inspired by a cause and act under the direction of, or with reference to, some 
political, religious, or military organization; by contrast, some of our subjects are stand-alone 
actors whose link to an ideal cause is at best tenuous. Ferrero (2006) and Wintrobe (2006a, 
2006b) focus on the interaction of selfish individuals with a group; Azam (2005), by contrast, 
focuses on the individual’s inter-generational altruism toward kin or fellow community 
members. Both the group and the altruism are conspicuously absent from the Herostratic 
context.  
A lone exception in this literature is a paper by Eswaran and Neary (2015), which 
models terrorist actions in the framework of the economics of identity captured by the 
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contrast between “Us” and “Them”. Social identity makes individual terrorist activities 
possible without explicit coordination, thus allowing analysis of decentralized terrorism 
(including so-called “lone wolf” terrorism) that is not organized or state- or group-sponsored. 
In their model, both the number of active terrorists and the intensity of individual terrorist 
effort increase not only in individuals’ altruism toward the in-group but also in their spite 
toward the out-group; furthermore, while in-group altruism is found to magnify the intensity 
of terrorist actions, it is out-group spite that is essential for the action to exist in the first place. 
Although their model is set in the context of a conflict between two countries for the control 
of a resource, and is not restricted to suicide terrorism, this key role of spite for out-group 
members, including a wanton disregard for their lives, captures an aspect of the rational 
pursuit of “evil” (although it is regarded as patriotic and benign by in-group members) that the 
present paper seeks to address.  
The other research topic that is germane to ours is lone-wolf terrorism, where 
economic analysis has been applied to the terrorists’ choice of methods of attack (Phillips, 
2011). In particular, Phillips and Pohl (2014), using prospect theory that incorporates 
dependence on a reference point, study the behavior of “copycat” terrorists that seek to 
emulate or surpass the achievement of a predecessor taken as a reference point and compute 
sets of preference orderings over attack methods from an extensive dataset on international 
terrorism. Even though many lone wolves have not been suicides, this paper stands out as the 
only instance to date that addresses a competition among individual agents in which, whatever 
the underlying ideology, inflicting a target level of injuries and fatalities is the agent’s 
purpose. This behavior is, however, simply assumed, not explained or grounded in utility 
theory. We make a step back to the foundations and provide a general theoretical framework 
that locates the lone wolf’s actions within a range of possible behaviors while not necessarily 
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requiring that the agent is a “terrorist” as normally understood (see the discussion of school 
shootings in a later subsection).   
Perhaps the predecessor to which the present paper is most directly related is Ferrero 
(2013), which explicitly introduces a value of being lovingly remembered after death into the 
utility function and models a “contract for martyrdom” between some individuals and a 
sponsoring organization, which provides a cult of martyrs to fulfill its side of the contract. The 
individual is motivated to sacrifice his life by the expectation of the cult that will keep his 
name and deeds alive; however, a cult will be granted to all who deserve it so that there is no 
competition among agents to outdo one another to secure one’s worship. The present paper 
turns this approach on its head: our Herostratic agents do value survival in their followers’ 
memory after death but try to achieve this by pursuing infamy for their heinous deeds instead 
of fame for their worthy deeds; there is no sponsoring organization but a cult of sorts 
nevertheless does develop and is anticipated at the time of action; but since the “cult” here is 
upheld by (some section of ) society itself, notoriety (i.e. making headlines) becomes the key 
factor and our agents are driven to compete and try to match and surpass one another’s 
achievements if they are not soon to be forgotten.  
 
3. The Herostratos syndrome 
 
3.1. Some history 
 
In this paper, we borrow the phrase “Herostratos syndrome” from Borowitz (2005), 
which is the first comprehensive study of the topic. Following his account (ibid., chap. 1), in 
356 BC a man named Herostratos burned to ashes the great temple of Artemis at Ephesus, a 
Greek city in today’s Turkey. The temple was celebrated as one of the Seven Wonders of the 
ancient world. Herostratos did not try to escape and he was then tortured and executed by the 
city authorities. The ancient sources provide no information on the perpetrator or the motive 
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of his act except that he avowedly did it so that his name may live forever after on account of 
the enormity of his crime. Precisely to defeat his purpose, the city authorities also decreed that 
his name shall never be mentioned so as to erase it from the historical record. This type of 
punishment for the most grievous offenses against the state was widespread in the ancient 
world and known in Roman law as “condemnation of memory” (damnatio memoriae). This 
memory ban, however, was soon flouted by the ancient authors themselves, through whose 
writings Herostratos’ name and deed have come down to us via a long tradition of literary and 
philosophical elaboration. 
While the memory ban as a policy tool deserves further discussion in a later section of 
this paper, it is interesting now to zoom in on the motives of Herostratos’ action. The reason 
why his name was not forgotten but handed down to history – and in this sense, his endeavor 
proved to be a resounding success – is because the ancient writers saw it as a paragon of a 
perverted quest for fame and immortality when joined to a perception of one’s mediocrity and 
failure. The ancient world had a lively cult of heroes – men whose name long outlived them 
on account of their virtue and worthy deeds. If a man – so reasoned the ancient commentators 
– is desperate for fame but is too base ever to hope to achieve it by heroic acts, he may try and 
satisfy his craving by uncommonly heinous acts. They do not mention any kind of emulation 
or competition for infamy taking place in their time; the Roman historian Valerius Maximus, 
however, noted that a singular innovation of Herostratos’ act was that by targeting an iconic 
monument – or, in other similar instances, by killing a famous man – the target’s celebrity 
would redound to the perpetrator, who would then wear it as his new identity. So Herostratos 
not only established a classic topic for intellectual argument but set a pattern that, though 
unknowingly, would be followed through the centuries to this day.  
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Borowitz (2005) provides many historical examples of attacks where the quest for 
infamy might credibly be diagnosed as the main objective pursued by the perpetrators,2 as 
well as an extensive discussion of various strands of literature. He distinguishes first the 
“destroyers” from the “killers” in his narratives. However, he then notes that 9/11 was a 
remarkable synthesis of these two types of attacks, where the highly symbolic Twin Towers 
and four large aircrafts were destroyed, while about 3,000 ordinary citizens were killed. In 
chapter 5, Borowitz (2005) discusses the pros and cons of identifying a Herostratic dimension 
in the 9/11 attacks citing several sources. Other examples of destruction of highly symbolic 
monuments for the sake of attracting world-wide publicity include the destruction of the 
Buddhas of Bamiyan in Afghanistan by the Taliban in March 2001 and the destruction of the 
2000-year old temple of Bel in Palmyra by ISIS in September 2015. The latter’s presentation 
of the resulting ruins in their English language magazine Dabiq leaves no doubt about the 
quest for infamy thus pursued. These three spectacular destructions got a world-wide echo in 
the popular media and the cyberspace and very quickly turned Osama Bin Laden into a 
household name, as well as to a lesser extent the Taliban and ISIS.  
Among the killer attacks described by Borowitz (2005), the rising phenomenon of 
school shootings is given special attention. It seems to be related to the instant fame that their 
perpetrators get thanks to the mass media and the cyberspace. 
 
3.2. The school shooting epidemic  
 
Massacres on American school premises by current or former students were relatively 
rare before the 1990s when they picked up and dramatically escalated in number and level of 
violence, leading mass media and scholars to speak of an epidemic (Larkin, 2009; Rocque, 
                                                 
2
 In an interesting variation, Bartlett (1993) shows that such a quest was common among the pagan Slav tribes of 
North-Eastern Europe in the Middle Ages, as the funeral orations of their prestigious members were praising 
their most infamous deeds. 
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2012; Agnich, 2015). The infamous shooting at Columbine High School in 1999 marked a 
turning point, providing an example and a “cultural script” for many subsequent followers to 
emulate. After Columbine, not only have actual school shootings multiplied but large and 
increasing numbers of planned shootings have been foiled by police or aborted for some other 
reasons, so that the total number of youths who set their minds on firing a weapon at their 
classmates has become an order of magnitude greater than in previous periods. Moreover, 
after Columbine, the phenomenon – previously almost exclusively American – has gone 
global, involving schools all over the world. A recent example is the deadly attack on a 
Swedish school carried out in October 2015 by a young man with Nazi sympathies but no 
links to any far-right organization. This was certainly a first: he wore a Darth Vader-style 
mask, cape, and helmet and, fittingly, his weapon of choice was a sword (Crouch, 2015). 
Finally, the context itself has begun to change: rampage killers have been targeting church 
groups, shopping malls, and gyms among other venues. Scholars and policy-makers have 
been struggling to understand the why and how of such epidemic.  
Observers have been baffled by the fact that, beyond being young, mostly white (in the 
U.S. at least), and overwhelmingly male, there is a dearth of common traits that could help 
build a profile of the typical perpetrator. Some perpetrators were psychotic, or were diagnosed 
mental disorders after the fact, but many were apparently normal kids. Some came from 
broken families or were physically or psychologically abused by parents or others, but many 
had grown up in functioning families with loving parents. Many had a history of social 
isolation and rejection and/or bullying by their peers, but some did not or were themselves 
bullies or were quite popular among their peers, and in any case their shooting rampage went 
well beyond the supposed offenders, targeting fellow students and school staff basically at 
random. So a troubled mind, a troubled background, and a quest for revenge, while 
undoubtedly a factor, seem insufficient to explain the shootings. What is more, troubled, 
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angry boys have always existed without engaging in any such behavior, so listing these and 
other risk factors cannot begin to account for the modernity of the phenomenon and for its 
increasing rate of occurrence.  
A suicidal intention, whether by killing oneself or by provoking the police to shoot the 
perpetrator (so-called “suicide by cop”), has often been carried out or at least attempted; even 
when not, the shooters often did not try to run but were prepared to face the consequences of 
their acts, ranging from capital punishment through life imprisonment to long periods of 
detention or other legal restraint. Explicit evidence for a suicidal intention, in addition to 
observed behavior, is often provided by the suicide notes left or the internet messages 
disseminated by the perpetrators prior to acting. This feature is reminiscent, on the one hand, 
of Islamic suicide terrorists in the Middle East and elsewhere, who typically record a video 
before immolating themselves (Lankford and Hakim, 2011, Nesser, 2015), and, on the other 
hand, of “suicide with hostile intent”, a ritualized procedure that was widespread across 
ancient Mediterranean cultures and in recent pre-industrial cultures around the world (Preti, 
2008; see also the literature cited therein). However, suicide terrorists are typically affiliated 
to an organization which directs them and provides a political cause for their martyrdom, 
while ancient hostile suicides were soldiers engaged in a military operation against an enemy 
and modern ethnographers’ suicides are intent on exacting revenge on specific individuals 
who wronged them. By contrast, school shooters are loners, they target civilians, and given 
that they engage in mass slaughter, the revenge motive behind their actions is, as we have 
seen, problematic. As to the political motive, Larkin (2009) argues that while the motivations 
of pre-Columbine school shooters were personal and focused on petty grievances, they were 
raised to an overtly political status by the Columbine killers, who stated in their videotapes 
that they wanted to “kick-start a revolution” among the victimized and downtrodden students 
of the world – a “manifesto” that apparently influenced subsequent shooters. Still, calling 
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such a motive “political”, when set against the motives of fighters, revolutionaries, and 
terrorists of all stripes, seems a long stretch, and what is more, targeting random fellow 
students seems distinctly inconsistent with the “revolutionary” motive as stated.  
A key to solving the puzzle may be found in the exemplary, trend-setting nature of the 
Columbine event itself. As Larkin (2009, 1312) writes, “the Columbine rampage has become 
a cultural script for many subsequent rampage shooters. For some, it was a record to be 
exceeded ….; for others, it was an incitement ….; for others, it was emulated in their own 
rampages ….; for still others, it was a tradition to be honored in their own attacks.” Even if 
only four shooters (two in the U.S. and two in Germany) managed to actually outdo 
Columbine’s death toll, the evidence of explicit imitation, referencing, and emulation of 
Columbine by subsequent shooters – often taken as an instance of “copycat killing” – is 
overwhelming for both completed and failed or thwarted school attacks in the United States, 
as well as for many of those in other countries. “The body count ….. exists primarily as a 
method of generating media attention”, which post-Columbine rampage shooters have 
attempted to influence rather than merely be influenced by them (ibid., 1322). This reveals the 
fundamental motive of post-Columbine killers: killing for notoriety. To these boys, “payback 
consists of killing convenient targets, making a statement, and dying in a blaze of glory” 
(ibid., 1323). Similarly, Lankford and Hakim (2011, 105) identify the drive to seek fame and 
glory as one of the most important similarities between rampage shooters and Palestinian 
suicide bombers; in both cases, this is a reaction to a condition where – albeit for different 
environmental reasons – the subjects suffer from low self-esteem. In one of the most revealing 
pieces of circumstantial evidence, as his foster mother reported, mall shooter Robert Hawkins 
wrote in his suicide note that “he was a piece of shit all of his life and now he’ll be famous” 
(ibid.). 
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In an insightful essay on the school shooting epidemic, Gladwell (2015) brings in 
sociologist Mark Granovetter’s well-known model of collective behavior (Granovetter, 1978), 
in which individuals’ decision to participate in a collective movement, such as a riot, is driven 
by their thresholds – defined as the number of people who need to be doing something before 
one agrees to join them. Riots are started by firebrands – individuals with a threshold of zero 
– and then grow by drawing in people with successively higher thresholds – up to people who 
would not normally even think of doing any such thing until and unless sufficiently many 
others were already doing it. Gladwell suggests that the school-shooting epidemic is like a 
slow-motion, evolving riot, in which each new participant’s action must be understood in 
reaction to previous participants. He reviews the evidence of the progression of the “riot” 
from the early psychopaths – the low-threshold instigators – to ever-higher-threshold boys 
who more and more identify with the school-shooting tradition and celebrate the cult of its 
heroes – the Columbine shooters. Concluding his discussion, Gladwell writes: “the riot has 
now engulfed the boys who were once content to play with chemistry sets in the basement. 
The problem is not that there is an endless supply of deeply disturbed young men who are 
willing to contemplate horrific acts. It’s worse. It’s that young men no longer need to be 
deeply disturbed to contemplate horrific acts.” 
The foregoing picture fits the pattern of Herostratic competition very well. The killers 
are engaged in a quest for notoriety and compete with one another over the increasing 
(intended) lethality of their attacks; the more recent recruits would not have started the 
movement but are ready to join the crowd. This Herostratic interpretation of the school-
shooting epidemic, however, carries a disturbing policy implication that is the opposite of the 
conventional wisdom on prevention and deterrence. This directs attention to early, preventive 
detection of possible candidates: the psychological or sociological models of cumulative risk 
factor, which profile disturbed males who are social outcasts with a troubled family 
 13 
background, a lust for revenge, and easy access to firearms (Rocque, 2012). If, however, we 
interpret the epidemic as a cumulative movement that slowly evolves through time and 
therefore the Nash equilibrium (which will be defined and analyzed in section 4) as a 
condition where no new entrant is willing to strike, the epidemic as heretofore seen will at 
some point begin to lose momentum and taper off even without any special counter-measures 
– the notoriety gains at the margin will no longer be worth sacrificing one’s life. Instead, 
attention should focus where the epidemic has not yet reached and therefore the potential 
gains from starting are enormous. One characteristic stands out: gender. The women’s 
representation in the epidemic has been so far negligible. If only a woman arises who is so 
deranged as to be willing to start out, we may be set to witness a fresh wave of school 
shootings with a vast unexplored territory to cover.  
 
3.3. Mohamed Merah’s Jihadist school shooting 
 
Mohamed Merah is a good example of a quasi-lone wolf whose main contacts with the 
world of Jihad was via the Internet. His story is well known because he took the time to spell 
out all the details in his conversation with the police while he was trapped in his flat in 
Toulouse (Moutouh, 2013). On day one, Sunday, March 11, Merah met a French Muslim 
soldier in Toulouse, pretending to be interested in buying the scooter the latter had advertised 
for sale. He eventually shot him dead. On day two, four days later, Merah took his own 
scooter to ride 50 km north to Montauban, where he shot three soldiers near the barracks they 
had just left to go on leave, as they were about to draw cash from an ATM machine. Two 
where French Muslims, while the third one was from the French Antilles. On day three, on 
March 19, Merah tried to trap another French soldier, but the plan fell through. Disappointed 
and idle, he then decided to go to the Jewish school Ozar Hatorah. There, he first started to 
shoot in the street, killing a teacher called Jonathan Sandler and one of his sons, and then 
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entered the school where he killed Sandler’s second son and a little girl. On his way out, he 
shot father and son again in the street, as they were still moving. The GoPro camera worn by 
Merah on the three occasions produced videos that ended up on various Jihadist websites. 
The first two days of killing had a clear strategic motive within a Jihadist framework, 
aimed at punishing collaborationist Muslim soldiers with a view to deepening the gap 
between the Muslim community and the French society at large. Still, the improvised attack 
on the Jewish school had a much stronger media impact, as it attracted the Minister of 
Interior, Claude Guéant, the President, Nicolas Sarkozy, as well as Benyamin Netanyahu who 
came to share the sorrow of the parents and children of the Ozar Hatorah school. In a nutshell, 
Jihad does not pay off to make a name for oneself, while an anti-Semitic school shooting 
makes you hit the headlines instantly. This set the standards for subsequent Muslim killers, 
who focused on killing Jews and artists more than on the Jihadist agenda against soldiers.   
The Merah case can be taken as the paragon of the Herostratic contract that ISIS is 
offering its followers in Europe. By endorsing and encouraging such actions through the 
implicit promise of wide publicity in the cyberspace, ISIS is trading off the harm it inflicts (at 
least in the short run) on the Palestinian cause by killing Jews in Europe against the fact that 
the latter offers the killer a much higher probability of getting instant stardom, so that 
allowing the killing of European Jews as an eligible Jihadist action will attract many more 
recruits than banning it. That is, ISIS is leveraging the Herostratos syndrome as a channel for 
attracting cheap cannon fodder in support of suicide bombings and mass massacres in Syria 
and Iraq – religion seems not to be powerful enough to attract enough fighters. So the 
Palestinians are sacrificed for the sake of the more general Sunni Muslim cause in the Middle 
East – hence the title of this paper. In this view, there is more than Jihad in the current wave 
of private mass killings in Europe, and the Merah pattern turns out to be much more similar to 
the purely Herostratic school shootings discussed above than is generally recognized.  
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The following model aims at better understanding how the Herostratic motive can play 
a dominant part in shaping the equilibrium of a killers’ game. 
  
4. A rational choice model of Herostratic attacks 
 
The aim of this section is to provide a model of hybrid killers whose motivations can 
encompass the pure Herostratos syndrome case as well as more general ones taking into 
account the negative spillovers that run counter to their proclaimed cause. It first focuses on 
the individual motivations to perform a suicide lethal attack before analyzing the Nash 
equilibrium number of such attacks. 
 
4.1. Micro-foundations 
 
Assume that there is a continuum of heterogeneous potential killers [ [0,k ∈ ∞  who 
would derive the following utility from perpetrating a suicide attack: 
 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), , , , , max , ,
q
U k k n k v n q c q k m nθ β ψ α µ θ ψ α β µ= − − ,     (1) 
 
where ( ), , 0v n q ψ ≥  is a continuously differentiable function that measures the expected 
impact on public opinion of perpetrating a given type of attack when n  such attacks are 
simultaneously perpetrated, and the quality of attack q  is chosen. Such “quality” measures 
the (intended) intensity of the attack in terms of lethality, number of potential victims, 
especially loathsome choice of targets or of weapons (such as the children sent out as human 
bombs by Boko Haram), and the like. The shift parameter ψ  could be called the publicity of 
the attack: it captures the media environment that will bring the killer’s name to the headlines 
and the sensitivity of public opinion to this kind of news; it can also be used as a policy tool to 
influence this. The function ( ), ,v n q ψ  thus captures the “Herostratic contract” described 
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above whereby infamous arsonists or killers have a high probability of being remembered for 
decades or even centuries, in a sort of macabre hall of fame. This expected impact is valued at 
the subjective price ( )kθ  by potential killer k . This subjective price measures the Herostratic 
leanings of individual k , and we assume that it is a continuously differentiable function that 
ranks, by convention, potential killers by decreasing values of ( )kθ , i.e., ( )' 0kθ <
 
Assuming that only suicide attacks are taking place within the period under study, and 
that all attackers actually die, entails that the number of attacks and the number of killers are 
the same. This definition of suicide attacks must be understood broadly so as to include all the 
cases where the killer dies in the end, whether by his own means or killed by the police after 
his action as happened to Mohamed Merah in Toulouse. Pape (2006) uses also a similarly 
broad definition of suicide attacks. The probability of the agent’s actually dying, whether by 
voluntary suicide or “suicide by cops”, could even be less than one provided he is 
subsequently apprehended or otherwise unable or unwilling to act again. The only point that 
matters is that the number of attacks and the number of killers are the same in this model, for 
the sake of simplicity.  
The number of attacks performed by the n  killers has a potentially ambiguous effect 
on the public’s collective memory. On the one hand, repeated attacks of a given type increase 
the public’s sensitivity to these attacks by creating an enhanced level of anxiety that amplifies 
their impact relative to an isolated one, thus creating a kind of addiction. On the other hand, 
beyond a point, the public might lose its interest for this type of “déjà vu” attacks. This 
potential ambiguity is captured by assuming a bell-shaped effect of ( ) on , ,n v n q ψ , allowing 
for an interior maximum. In contrast, the attack’s quality q  has a monotonically positive 
effect, with diminishing marginal returns, on its expected impact v (.). The cost of the attack 
( ) 0c qα ≥  is assumed to be an increasing and convex function of its quality q. This cost may 
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include both the direct financial cost and the time, skill, and effort costs of planning, 
organizing, and procuring the necessary material for the attack, all of which would naturally 
be increasing with its quality (recalling that the latter is a gauge of how daring, outrageous, 
massive, and unmatched the attack is) irrespective of whether they are borne by the attacker 
himself or by some organization behind him. The positive parameter α  is a shift parameter 
reflecting the security environment in which the potential killer operates, e.g., the 
effectiveness of the legal apparatus restricting the purchase of firearms, whether legally or 
illegally, and its degree of enforcement. Thus, defining n%  as the maximum of ( ), ,v n q ψ  with 
respect to n , we have: 
( ) ( ) ( )
2
2, 0, 0, 0, ' 0, " 0
v v v vSign Sign n n c q c q
n q q ψ
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
= − > ≤ > > >
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
% . (2) 
         
Moreover, utility function (1) also includes ( ) ( ), ' 0m n m nµ > , where 0µ >  is another 
shift parameter. This function captures the negative externality, or unintended side effects, 
entailed by the attacks, which are obviously increasing in the number of attacks. For example, 
repeated spectacular killings of Jews in Europe increase the migration of other Jews to Israel, 
a phenomenon that furthers the interests of Zionists while being detrimental to Palestinians. 
Similarly, a lot of the killing entailed by suicide bombing attacks falls on people whose 
interest is supposed to be served by the attacks. These negative spillovers, or “collateral 
damage”, are valued at the subjective price ( )kβ  by potential killer k . Hence, a high value 
of ( )kβ  might describe an “ideological” killer, i.e. one with a high degree of commitment to 
a cause that might be damaged by the attack. However, given our ordering of k, implying 
( )' kθ  <0, there is no natural way to sign the derivative ( )' kβ  – a fact that will be important 
to the structure of the equilibrium. 
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Table 1 summarizes the types of potential killers that can be described by this utility 
function by combining high or low values of ( ) ( ){ },k kθ β . 
 
Table 1: Taxonomy of Potential Killers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2. The Herostratic competition 
 
The borderline types are the most interesting ones from the policy point of view. 
These are the potential killers that small changes in incentives could motivate to cross the line 
one way or the other. The Nash equilibrium of the game analyzed below determines who does 
perpetrate an attack and who refrains from it, and thus the equilibrium number of attacks n. 
The latter in turn determines the equilibrium quality q of the attacks which is governed by the 
function described in proposition 1. 
 
Proposition 1: The chosen quality of the attack may be written as: 
          ( )( ) ( ) ( )
* * * *
* , , , ,  , 0, 0 and 0q q q qq q k n Sign Sign n n
n k
θ ψ α
θ ψ α
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
= = − > > <
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
% .  (3) 
if: 
          
2 2
Sign Sign  and 0v v v
q n n q ψ
∂ ∂ ∂
= >
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
.               (4) 
 
Proof: From the first-order condition ( ) ( )' *k v q c qθ α∂ ∂ = , one can compute the 
total differential and rearrange the terms to get: 
 High ( )kβ  Low ( )kβ  
High ( )kθ  Passionate Borderline Herostratic Killer 
Low ( )kθ  Hands-Off Sympathizer Anomic Borderline 
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( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2 2
2 2
' *
*
" *
v v vd k k d n d c q d
q q n qd q
c q k v q
θ θ ψ αψ
α θ
 ∂ ∂ ∂
+ + − ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ 
=
− ∂ ∂
.     (5) 
 
Then, the partial derivatives in (3) can be read off (5).  
Condition (4) is a very natural assumption saying that ( ), ,v n q ψ  becomes steeper as a 
function of q when it shifts upwards as 
 or n ψ  change and flatter when it shifts downwards. 
Then, it gives to the quality of attack a realistic tournament property within a certain range, 
namely that the Herostratic killer will invest more in the quality of his attack, the larger the 
number of attacks of the same type expected to take place in the same period. This is nicely 
illustrated by Mehdi Nemmouche who declared: “Je vais faire cinq fois Merah au 14 juillet” (I 
will do five times Merah on French National Day, translation by JPA). It is then extremely 
significant that Nemmouche felt like competing with Merah on the sensational but 
strategically inept Jew-killing front, while he did not attempt any more strategic moves like 
killing French Muslim soldiers as did Merah in Montauban as a way of deterring young 
French Muslims from getting integrated in their society and of inciting possibly some of them 
to join the Global Jihad instead.  
Lastly, potential killers are facing an opportunity cost of perpetrating a suicide attack 
captured here by a value of life, which we assume constant for all, ( ) 0,L k kλ= > ∀ , for 
simplicity. Then their decision rule is naturally that potential killer k will perpetrate the 
suicide attack if ( ) ( )( ), , , , ,U k k nθ β ψ α µ λ>  and will refrain from it otherwise.3 This 
realistically assumes that there is free entry in the killing activity, thus ruling out pre-emptive 
                                                 
3
 In an interesting contribution to this line of thinking, Apolte (2017) argues that an individual’s decision to 
embark on a suicide-killing path may be time-inconsistent and addresses this commitment problem by 
postulating different profiles of lifetime reservation utility. He finds that only a person beset by a serious “burden 
of life” will fulfill his “contract with himself” and carry out the suicidal attack as a “lone wolf”, while those not 
so burdened will need an external enforcement mechanism such as one provided by a terrorist organization. The 
incentive role played by Herostratic competition among agents is, however, not addressed by his model. 
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interventions of the police that could take people into custody just on the basis of their 
profiling as “dangerous potential killers”, e.g., because the police cannot identify each 
individual’s preference parameters ( ) ( ){ },k kθ β . As this decision to kill depends on n, each 
potential killer must work out the equilibrium number of attacks in order to make his own 
attack decision. We use a simple simultaneous-move equilibrium framework to analyze the 
resulting outcome. 
 
4.3. The equilibrium number of attacks in the Herostratic equilibrium 
 
For the sake of simplicity, let us rule out any kind of direct coordination among the 
potential killers and thus use the standard simultaneous-move Nash equilibrium concept. This 
also neglects the sequential occurrence of attacks that can be observed in reality, often 
bunched in time, for the sake of simplicity. Moreover, one might argue that the Herostratic 
killers want to be remembered for a very long time, as Herostratos himself who is still cited 
more than two millennia after his arson. Then, a lag of a few weeks or a few months between 
successive Herostratic attacks is unlikely to matter for their long-run reputation impacts. 
Similarly, let us assume that ( )kβ  is continuously differentiable. This imposes some 
constraint on the type of heterogeneity among potential killers that can be handled by the 
model. It entails that people who have similar preferences regarding the Herostratic contract 
also have similar preferences regarding the negative spillovers of their acts, irrespective of 
whether they change in the same or the opposite direction. Then, define the killer’s 
(subjective) profit function as: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( ), , , , , , , , , ,k n U k k npi ψ α µ λ θ β ψ α µ λ≡ − .   (6) 
 
This function is continuously differentiable in ,  , , ,  and k n ψ α µ λ . Then, the decision 
rule defined above may also be written as: potential killer k will perpetrate the suicide attack 
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if ( ), , , , , 0k npi ψ α µ λ ≥  and will refrain from it otherwise. Because n  is endogenously 
determined in equilibrium, the latter is in fact determining the identity of the players who will 
commit an attack and of those who will refrain from it. 
Let us now define the Herostratic equilibrium of this game as a Nash equilibrium 
where ( )kθ  is the key determinant of the killers’ identities, i.e., where the n  active killers are 
the ones with the largest values of ( )kθ . 
 
Definition 1: A Herostratic equilibrium of this game is a Nash equilibrium where 
* *n k= . 
 
Proposition 2 gives a familiar-looking set of sufficient conditions for such a simple 
and meaningful Nash equilibrium to exist in this game. 
 
Proposition 2: There exists a unique Herostratic equilibrium of this game where 
( )* *  and *, *, , , , 0n k k npi ψ α µ λ= =  if the following four conditions hold: 
(i) Single Crossing from Above: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )' , *, ' , ,k v n q k m n k nθ ψ β µ< ∀ ∀                         (7) 
(ii) Bounded Addiction: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
' ' , *, '
, ,
k m n k v n q k m nv k n
n k
β µ θ ψ β µ
θ
− − ∂  < ∀ ∀
∂
           (8) 
(iii) Rare-Killing Allure: 
( )
0, 0
lim , , , , , 0,
k n
k npi ψ α µ λ ψ
→ →
> ∀                 (9) 
and: 
(iv) Asymptotic Innocence: 
( )lim , , , , , 0,  and 
k
k n npi ψ α µ λ ψ
→∞
< ∀ ∀ .              (10) 
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Condition (7) ensures that for any given value of { }, , ,n ψ α µ , ( ), , , , , 0k npi ψ α µ λ =  
has at most one solution. It restricts the admissible range of correlations across ks between the 
values that they attach to the Herostratic impact of their attacks and to the negative spillovers 
that they entail. The condition is obviously satisfied if ( )' 0kβ ≥ , i.e. if people with the 
strongest Herostratic tastes have the lowest valuation of collateral damage; in this case, as k 
increases we move diagonally from Herostratic killer to Hands-off sympathizer in Table 1. By 
contrast, condition (7) may or may not hold if ( )' 0kβ < . It might fail for example if people 
who attach a slightly lower value to the Herostratic impact of an attack also care significantly 
less for the latter’s negative spillovers. In that case, the utility derived from killing might 
always be strictly above the value of life for all the potential killers who would then all go for 
it if (9) also held. Moreover, failure of (7) to hold could entail that killers could belong to 
several disjoint intervals of the k  line (see Appendix A), for example that beside people with 
the strongest Herostratic leanings another set of people with very weak such leanings would 
engage in killing, while those with interim values would refrain from killing. Conditions (7) 
and (8) jointly rule this out and give the equilibrium analyzed here a welcome monotonicity 
property for the sake of interpretation. Condition (8) requires that the Herostratic impact of 
the attacks does not increase too strongly with their number, for example because the public 
gets affected even by the first isolated attack. Notice that the term in square brackets is 
negative by the single-crossing condition, so that the right-hand side of (8) is always positive. 
Hence, (8) might hold even in the case of a pure Herostratic killer like Andreas Lubitz, the 
pilot who crashed a Germanwings flight in March 2015, probably was, with ( ) 0kβ = . (See 
Appendix A for proof that failure of (8) to hold might imply multiple equilibria.) Hence, (7), 
(8), (9) and (10) jointly entail that a unique, interior Nash equilibrium exists where people 
 23 
with strong Herostratic leanings will engage in killing while people with weaker ones do not 
cross that line.  
 
Figure 1: The Nash equilibrium of Proposition 2 
 
Figure 1 offers some intuition about this Nash equilibrium. The bell-shaped curve 
represents the locus of the { },k n  pairs such that ( ), , , , , 0k npi ψ α µ λ = . It is straightforward 
to check that this curve reaches a maximum when: 
 
( ) ( )
( )
'
0
k m nv
n k
β µ
θ
∂
= >
∂
,               (11) 
 
so this occurs when n n< %  , i.e. the v (.) function is still increasing in n (see (2)). All the { },k n  
pairs located above this locus are such that ( ), , , , , 0k npi ψ α µ λ <  while all those below it 
have ( ), , , , , 0k npi ψ α µ λ > . The Nash equilibrium described in Proposition 2 is found where 
this locus intersects the 45° line. All the active killers are found on or below this locus while 
all the potential killers whose k lies above this locus have ( ), , , , , 0k npi ψ α µ λ <  and thus 
refrain from killing. The equilibrium depicted in Figure 1 occurs when n n< %  and is such that 
( ), , , , , 0k npi ψ α µ λ <  k = n 
( ). 0pi >  
n* 
k* 
k 
1 
n 
( ), , , , , 0k npi ψ α µ λ =  
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the Herostratic tournament described in Proposition 1 is in full gear, as the quality of attacks 
is increasing with their number. This equilibrium is not a symmetric one, as each killer will 
choose a quality level ( )( )* , *, ,q k nθ α ψ  that depends on the idiosyncratic subjective price 
( )kθ  as shown by Proposition 1. The school shootings epidemic, described in a previous 
section, fits this picture particularly well, with the quality of attacks increasing with their 
(cumulative) number. The resulting increase in notoriety and in the subjective profit from the 
attacks as the number of attacks/participants grows nicely captures the bandwagon effect that 
lures in people with increasing participation thresholds à la Granovetter.  
The k n=  line may in fact intersect the ( ), , , , , 0k npi ψ α µ λ =  locus on either side of 
n%  . Then *n n> %   may only occur if this intersection is found in the downward-sloping part of 
the locus, and far enough from its maximum. In this case, the quality of the attacks is 
decreasing with their number. Figure 2 illustrates a case where this might happen.  
 
Figure 2: A case where n* might be above n%  
 
Appendix A shows that the sufficient conditions set out by Proposition 2 are not 
necessary to produce a meaningful Nash equilibrium whose properties can be analyzed 
( ). 0pi >  
n* 
k* 
k 
1 
n 
k = n 
( ), , , , , 0k npi ψ α µ λ =  
( ), , , , , 0k npi ψ α µ λ <  
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graphically. However, the monotonicity of the equilibrium described by Proposition 2 and 
Figures 1 and 2 makes it simpler and more appealing than those with multiple equilibria, with 
or without disjoint sets of killers. This is why we use the well-behaved case to derive some 
policy implications in the next section; to do that, we first discuss the comparative statics 
properties of the Herostratic equilibrium.   
 
5. Some policy implications  
 
Public policies to counter the Herostratic threat in this model can work through four 
channels: (i) by affecting directly the impact of the attack on public opinion (ψ ), (ii) by 
affecting its opportunity cost ( λ ), (iii) by affecting the cost of choosing a more spectacular 
attack (α ), or (iv) by affecting the perceived cost of collateral damage ( µ ). As *  and *n q  
are jointly determined, the four policy tools affect both outcomes simultaneously. Figures 1 
and 2 can be used to work out their impacts on *n . A look at equations (1) and (6) shows that 
an increase in λ , in α , or in µ , and a fall in ψ , would shift down the ( ), , , , , 0k npi ψ α µ λ =  
locus along the k = n line and drive some potential killers – the borderline ones – into 
inaction, irrespective of whether we are in a Figure 1 or Figure 2 type of Nash equilibrium. To 
confirm this, Appendix B gives the comparative statics derivatives. Notice that conditions (7) 
and (8) ensure a continuous response of *n , ruling out the discontinuous jumps that might 
otherwise arise (discussed in Appendix A).  
 
5.1. Limitations of cost-oriented policies  
 
Work on λ  is likely to be the least cost-effective: it basically affects reservation utility 
and tries to provide people with better alternatives than becoming a suicide terrorist – that is, 
it seeks to influence individuals’ participation constraint. So economic growth, better-paid 
jobs, and the availability of social services on a non-discriminatory basis can certainly 
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undercut the appeal of the Herostratic contract (see Azam, 2012). By the same token, a 
general improvement in Law and Order, even if not specifically targeted at the Herostratic 
crimes, would have a similar effect by providing a safer social environment. This is Berman’s 
(2009) well-known suggestion to drain the water where terrorist organizations fish for 
recruits; a policy of increasing λ  would be its counterpart in the world considered in this 
paper where there exist no organizations but only individuals. With or without organizations, 
however, such a policy promises to be an enormously costly, long drawn-out operation as it 
must confront a huge pool of potential recruits without knowing who they are in advance of 
action. Improving the social lot of all the Muslim residents of Europe, while worthwhile in 
itself, does not look very much on target. The approach initiated by Azam (2005), Wintrobe 
(2006), Ferrero (2006, 2013), and pursued further in this paper, seeks to address individuals’ 
incentives to act, aiming at certain types of individuals and trying to change their perceived 
costs and benefits from action.    
If the cost of action ( )c qα increases parametrically, for example because the 
government increases α  by making planning and implementation more difficult, q* will fall 
by Proposition 1 and the actions undertaken will be less heinous than before. This could be 
achieved either through tighter gun control or by disrupting more systematically Jihadists’ or 
White Supremacists’ Facebook and Twitter accounts (Stern and Berger, 2015). This in turn 
reduces the value of the attack in the eyes of the prospective killers and shifts the ( ). 0pi =  
locus downwards, thus reducing the number of active killers. However, parameter α  can also 
be used to provide an alternative explanation to the surprising overrepresentation of engineers 
among violent extremists, be they Islamists or extreme right wingers, recently uncovered by 
Gambetta and Hertog (2016). The latter invoke personality traits that lead these people to self-
select into engineering studies and sometimes into violent extremism. In the present 
framework, engineers would have a lower α  than the other potential killers, giving them a 
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cost advantage over them in performing high-quality attacks and inciting more of them to 
strike even at relatively low values of n . Hence, the present model predicts that engineers 
should be overrepresented among killers, but should also frequently have a leading or even 
founding role in terrorist organizations, as Gambetta and Hertog (2016) have observed. 
Correlatively, this would explain why lone wolves like Merah or Breivik, with a different 
educational experience, perpetrated low-skill attacks. By contrast, Gambetta and Hertog found 
that very few graduates in social sciences or humanities figure prominently among violent 
extreme-right or Islamist terrorists, while their presence was overwhelming in the European 
extreme-left groups of the 1970-80s. This is arguably due to either their high α  or their high 
( )kβ (or both) as these groups specialized in low-casualties and precisely-targeted 
assassinations (Gambetta and Hertog, 2016). 
Then, one might think of shifting the collateral damage function ( )m nµ , i.e., 
increasing µ , by subsidizing European Jews’ emigration to Israel when anti-Semitic attacks 
occur. This might be an effective, though roundabout, course of action. But it may have 
unfortunate side effects that social welfare considerations should take into account, as this 
would entail a clear loss for those remaining behind. Another worrying tactic to shift ( )m nµ  
may involve actions that are unacceptable under the rule of law – such as retaliatory actions 
against random, innocent Muslims to increase the psychological pressure on the guilty ones. 
However, although such unacceptable policies are clearly out of question, there remains the 
possibility of clarifying the debate about these collateral damages by sensitizing the exposed 
groups about their magnitude and bringing out in the open the tradeoffs involved, which ISIS 
propaganda is carefully hiding. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the effectiveness of 
this course of action depends on the potential killers’ subjective evaluation of this externality: 
the pure Herostratic type, with a ( )kβ  close to zero, will be totally unresponsive. However, a 
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sensitization campaign of the kind just discussed might be a way to raise ( )kβ  for some 
borderline anomic potential killers, assuming that their low ( )kβ  is due more to ignorance 
than to sheer indifference. 
Finally, a further word of caution is in order. All the tools so far discussed work when 
the outcome is at the zero-profit Nash equilibrium of Proposition 2. The existence of this 
equilibrium is guaranteed, among other things, by the assumption of an unlimited supply of 
potential killers. However, nothing rules out the possibility of a corner solution, which would 
occur when there is a finite upper bound on k k≤ and this maximum number of potential 
killers is so small that the actual number of active killers is equal to it and lower than the zero-
profit equilibrium number * *n k n k= < = . In this case, all the potential killers cross the line 
because all of them have a strictly positive profit from doing it – condition (10) would still 
hold if k were free to increase without bounds but the upper bound prevents this. Then, as the 
number of active killers is just determined by the existing number of potential killers, we do 
not learn much from the model. In this case – as one would expect from a corner solution – a 
small parameter change that shifts down the ( ). 0pi =  locus somewhat might have no effect on 
the equilibrium outcome. So it seems that Herostratic killing must be popular enough for the 
policy tools reviewed above to work; condition (9) of Proposition 2, however, ensures that 
these killers will be active even when they are rare. There is no obvious defense against this.  
This comment also applies to the Herostratic channel discussed next. 
 
5.2. The Herostratic channel 
 
Work on the shift parameter ψ , which controls the ( ).v  function, seems to be the 
policy course that specifically targets the Herostratic syndrome and at the same time 
minimizes the negative side effects. This is more easily said than done, however. Naming and 
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shaming the killer will not work: eternal shame is exactly the killer’s aspiration. The ideal 
solution would be to track down and strike at the killer’s following, since this is a kind of cult 
that perpetuates the memory of the martyr. But unlike the cult of martyrs analyzed in Ferrero 
(2013), in which the followers praise, cherish and remember the martyr because in their eyes 
he or she was extraordinarily “good”, here they remember him because he was extraordinarily 
“bad”; so whereas in the “good” case heaping shame and ridicule on the martyr and turning 
the followers’ devotion away from it might work, here, paradoxically, one would have to 
counter the voluntarily chosen shame by publicly arguing that the act was not so bad after all 
– a prospect that cannot even be seriously entertained. Furthermore, as the American TV 
serial The Following nicely illustrates, persecuting the cult may even have the perverse effect 
of thrilling the followers and galvanizing them into action, in imitation of their hero. Here it 
may be helpful to note that often even the most outrageous views and the most heinous crimes 
are endorsed and cherished by groups of contrarians who give rise to a cult similar to those 
celebrating “good” heroes, martyrs, and saints. We have seen that the school shooting 
epidemic can be understood as a moving cult of heroes; and today on the web there are fan 
groups dedicated to almost anything, including serial killers, spree killers, Nazis, and what 
not. If so, striking down these cults and shutting down their websites can certainly help. 
However, the pure Herostratic character does not require the existence of such a supporting 
group; even if he should expect universal hate as an aftermath, it is the notoriety itself that 
spurs him into action. Then the only recourse seems to be the punishment already enacted in 
antiquity: obliteration of the perpetrator’s name from all records. 
However, as we have seen, the name ban ultimately failed for Herostratos himself.4 
For one thing, the extent of the enforcer’s reach was crucial: the reach of the Greek city-states 
                                                 
4
 It is interesting that at a much earlier time, a name ban was decreed by God on Amalek, an arch-enemy of the 
Israelites during the period of their exodus from Egypt: they were enjoined to “blot out the remembrance of 
Amalek from under heaven” (Deuteronomy 25: 19; cf. Exodus 17: 14). This ban too obviously failed as the 
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did not extend beyond the city’s territory; this improved as the Roman Empire gradually came 
to encompass most of the Mediterranean world. Even then, the Herostratos case shows that 
the enormity of the deed itself carried the day: as the destruction of the temple could not be 
forgotten, the perpetrator’s name would sooner or later resurface. Furthermore, as Borowitz’s 
(2005, chap. 1) account makes clear, in most cases of damnatio memoriae that were recorded 
in antiquity, the penalty was effective because it was inflicted on socially or politically 
prominent individuals, whose family stood to lose from the obliteration of the man’s record. 
An inter-generational punishment was thus involved, as in Azam (2005). By contrast, here we 
are typically dealing with nobodies who strive to become somebodies and whose family ties 
are irrelevant. Finally, the effectiveness of the penalty was in part contingent on the offender’s 
vulnerability to some detail of it; in ancient Rome, for example, the offender’s family home 
was razed, which made such a basic family custom as the cult of ancestors impossible. By 
contrast, religion is irrelevant in the pure Herostratic criminal.   
If such a punishment was so difficult effectively to enforce in traditional societies, the 
prospects for its application in the age of the internet look even less encouraging. It would 
involve a restriction of media freedom censoring the sensational reports of Herostratic attacks 
or – perhaps more realistically – a convincing campaign showing that these killers all belong 
to the same type of psychopaths who deserve compassion more than infamy or hatred, thus 
downgrading their reputation and frustrating their quest. However, there are milder methods 
of spoiling the Herostratic killers’ names that might have some marginal impact. The model 
suggests that the aim is in fact to trivialize these attacks, instead of sensationalizing them as 
the media tend to do today. A possible solution might be a centralized record-keeping of the 
different types of such attacks that would give them a serial number. Then, the media would 
only mention their code numbers, while the names of the perpetrators could be found on a 
                                                                                                                                                        
writers of the Bible later recorded his name and deeds, although this has survived in Judaism to this day as a 
ritual curse against the most egregious enemies of the Jewish people. 
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web page in the list of all those who perpetrated similar crimes before. For example, EJK2678 
would mean “the 2678th killer of European Jews”, SCK136 would mean “the 136th killer of 
children at school”, or PC59 would mean “the 59th plane crasher”.  
In the same vein, the mainstream media should put more emphasis on the cases where 
ISIS and the other Jihadist groups are killing Muslims, especially in the Middle East and 
North Africa, where Muslim civilians and soldiers are mowed down by the thousands, and 
should invest in a carefully attended body count. Prospective Jihadists would then realize that, 
despite the distorted image broadcasted by Western media, Jihad is currently mainly about 
killing fellow Muslims, sometimes branded by a takfir (accusation of apostasy) in a highly 
disputable fashion. Still, as far as Jihadists or White Supremacists are concerned, quite a lot of 
the publicity they value is not conveyed by official news channels, but by the social media 
where praise for the attacks and the most gory videos can be posted. Stern and Berger (2015) 
discuss what the main operators, Twitter in particular, and counter-terrorist organizations are 
prepared to do to disrupt these communication channels and the value of letting some of it 
come out as a source of information for the police.  
A final policy implication that is related to the publicity parameter highlights the areas 
and groups that represent the greatest risk and are therefore most in need of attention to early 
warnings. In both terrorism studies and criminology, researchers normally rely on datasets of 
previous cases and on this basis engage in profiling of the typical perpetrator. So for example 
the typical school shooter in the U.S. is a white male student or former student, possibly with 
grievances toward his peers or his school. A typical Islamic suicide terrorist is a young, 
unmarried male Muslim who underwent a process of radicalization either in a war-torn, 
foreign-occupied Muslim-majority country or in some backwater of disaffected, alienated 
residents of western societies with a Muslim background. But if the quest for notoriety at all 
costs is the basic motive, the prospective attacker will try to get away from the crowd of his 
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peers and overturn the established profile. Explorers of virgin grounds make history, while 
those who follow in their path less and less so. The next Herostratic killer, then, is likely to 
still belong in the class of school massacres or Islamic terrorism, so as to permit comparison 
and gauging against previous attackers, but to possess personal characteristics that are non-
typical and select targets and methods of attack that are special and unprecedented.  
For some examples, Christian churches and church groups have been targeted in 
various countries of the world, but a strike at the Vatican itself would indeed make headlines. 
As discussed in a previous section, world-class monuments that are unique and irreplaceable 
have already proven to be attractive targets. There are very few and disconnected terrorist 
incidents using unconventional mass-destruction weapons to date, so an attack with, say, 
poison gas (to say nothing of a nuclear device) would be big news. Children have been among 
the victims in many instances but a suicide attack targeted at an audience of teenage girls, as 
happened at a concert in Manchester in May 2017, was a novel turn.  
As to personal characteristics, gender stands out. Suicide terrorism used to be a male 
occupation except in a few specific organizations (like the Chechen insurgents and Sri 
Lanka’s Tamil Tigers), but since the beginning of the century female participation has been 
rapidly increasing even among Islamists worldwide (Bloom, 2005, 2011). As to mass killers, 
even the Chechen separatists involved only men in the attack at the Beslan school in North 
Ossetia in September 2004 that killed 385 people. So far, women have not been found, except 
in supporting roles, among homegrown Islamic groups and lone wolves in Europe, nor had 
they been found in the U.S. before the San Bernardino massacre of December 2015; so a 
wave of female killers seeking fame is to be expected here. This is even more the case for 
school shootings, where at least in the US the perpetrators have so far all been males. As 
discussed in a previous section, the epidemics in its current form will sooner or later begin to 
die out as the drive to emulate and surpass the predecessors’ body count can only go so far. 
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But a turn to female shooters might well start to draw on a vast, untapped pool of potential 
perpetrators. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This paper has made the perfectly obvious point that perfectly rational agents can have 
very weird preferences. This has been done by embedding in a game-theoretic framework the 
Herostratos syndrome that some authors, including some psychologists, have identified as a 
potential explanation for some odious crimes. The latter are perpetrated by individuals who 
prefer to be known for their infamous acts rather than remaining anonymous. This framework 
seems to shed some useful light on a series of events that shook European countries in the 
2010s, when different individuals perpetrated some spectacular lethal attacks. The key point is 
that in some of these cases, the killers are perpetrating some crimes that are in contradiction 
with their proclaimed objectives. In some others, they openly admit that the quest for infamy 
is their only motive. The model analyzed above helps us to understand these different cases in 
a unified framework based on the rational-choice postulate. We have provided a set of simple 
conditions that ensure existence of a well-behaved Nash equilibrium where Herostratic killers 
are competing with a view to make a name for themselves in infamy. Although this behavior 
may legitimately be diagnosed as psychopathic, because of the weird preferences that it 
reveals, this model shows that it would be highly misleading to invoke any form of 
irrationality to explain it. We have finally offered some policy suggestions that focus on ways 
and means to reduce the publicity the killers enjoy and thus frustrate their quest for notoriety. 
Clearly, some hard policy-oriented thinking is the task ahead.  
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Appendix A: Multiple equilibria  
 
             Figure A1: A case where (7) fails over a range R 
 
Figure A1 depicts the case where the single-crossing condition (7) fails over a given 
range R . This may occur because ( )' kβ  <0 becomes too low relative to ( )' kθ , for given 
values of ( ).v  and  ( )m nµ , over a certain range, before (7) holds again; in this case ( ).pi  
may become negative over a certain range before turning positive again. Then, *n  would not 
be the unique Nash equilibrium, as can be checked using Figure A1, where the potential 
killers belonging to the interval ] [AB  of the k  axis for which the k n=  line lies to the right 
of the ( ), , , , , 0k npi ψ α µ λ =  locus in the interim range are facing ( ), , , , , 0k npi ψ α µ λ <
 
for 
every n k≥ . These “passionate borderline” potential killers, in the terms of table 1, have a 
high enough ( )kβ  to refrain from killing despite a high ( )kθ  corresponding to their 
relatively low k . Some messy manipulations of the diagram show that an equilibrium might 
exist in this case with two disjoint sets of killers and a total number of killers ˆ* *n n<  such 
that the highest index of the active killers would be ˆ ˆ* *k n> . To see this, exclude the inactive 
( ), , , , , 0k npi ψ α µ λ <
C  
( ). 0pi >
A  
B  
ˆ *n  
nˆ  
( ). 0pi <  
k = n 
R  
n* 
k* 
k 
1 
n 
( ), , , , , 0k npi ψ α µ λ =
ˆ*k  
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potential killers and draw the nˆ  line from B  parallel to the  k n=  line as shown by the 
leftward-pointing arrow. A Nash equilibrium is found at the intersection of this line with the 
( ), , , , , 0k npi ψ α µ λ =  locus at point C . However, if we think of a slow-moving groping 
process along the k n=  line starting from low values of k , then this process would end up at 
Nash equilibrium A  beyond which ( ). 0pi <  up to point B . A discontinuous jump would then 
be needed to move beyond B  where ( ). 0pi >  until C  is reached. Notice that these borderline 
potential killers could be turned into Herostratic killers by a downward shift of the ( ). 0pi =  
locus in this neighborhood; hence, the existence of equilibrium A  and the entailed need for a 
discontinuous jump from A  to B  depends on the configuration of parameter values. For 
example, a large enough fall in α  or increase in ψ  (see equations (3), (6), and the discussion 
in section 5) would expand the ( ). 0pi >  area, thus shifting the ( ). 0pi =  locus downwards in 
the neighborhood of [ ]AB  until it could make the latter empty. This could trigger a massive 
wave of Herostratic killing starting from A  as the ( ). 0pi <  area shrank and a higher * *k n=  
point would become the unique equilibrium.  
Figure A2 discusses another case where three intersections may exist between the 
( ), , , , , 0k npi ψ α µ λ =  locus and the k n=  line because (8) fails although (7) holds. However, 
disjoint sets of active killers cannot exist in the Nash equilibrium in this case. To see this, 
imagine again a slow-moving groping process along the k n=  line starting from low values 
of k . Here again, the process would get stuck at A  as in the previous case. However, if a 
jump occurred to move beyond B , all the potential killers ] ]k AB∈  would become active as 
n
 would become large enough for them to cross the line and the process would converge 
eventually to equilibrium C  with * *k n= . Hence, in this case, the borderline potential killers 
] ]k AB∈  are just high-threshold Granovetter followers that jump into the bandwagon when 
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n
 becomes large enough, as discussed in section 3.2. Locally excessive addiction means that 
any additional attack steeply increases the expected impact on public opinion ( ), *,v n q ψ  in 
this neighborhood, in contrast to a fairly flat range just preceding it on its left. This also 
captures a threshold effect.  
 
Figure A2: The case of locally excessive addiction 
 
This potential need for a discontinuous jump in the groping process is ruled out if the 
slope of the ( ), , , , , 0k npi ψ α µ λ =  locus is always lower than 1 in the { },k n  space: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0
'
1,
' , , '
k m n k v nd k
n
d n k v n q k m n
pi
β µ θ
θ ψ β µ
=
− ∂ ∂
= < ∀
−
.            (A1) 
 
The denominator of (12) is always negative by (7) so that (12) requires that the 
Bounded Addiction condition (8) holds, as it is obtained by rearranging the terms while the 
term in square brackets in (8) is negative. 
 
B  
A  
C  
( ), , , , , 0k npi ψ α µ λ <  
n* 
k* 
k 
1 
n 
k = n 
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( ). 0pi >  
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Appendix B: Comparative statics 
 
Consider the Nash equilibrium with ( ). 0pi =  and * *k n= . Since the single-crossing 
condition (7) holds for any k , it will hold also for * *k n= . Let us compute the change in the 
equilibrium level of *n  due to changes in { }, , ,ψ α µ λ , i.e., the shift of the intersection of the 
( ). 0pi =  locus with the k n=  line in Figures 1 or 2. From (1) and (6), we can write the zero-
profit condition when * *k n=  as:  
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )*, , , , * *, *, * * * 0n n v n q c q n m npi ψ α µ λ θ ψ α β µ λ= − − − = .    (B1) 
 
Then, taking the total differential, taking due account of the first-order condition  
( ) ( )' *k v q c qθ α∂ ∂ =  and re-arranging the terms yields: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
* * * *
*
* ' * ' * * * ' *
*
v
c q d n m n d d n d
d n
v
n n v n m n n m n
n
α β µ λ θ ψψ
θ θ β µ β µ
∂
+ + − ∂
= ∂
+ − −∂
.      (B2) 
  The Bounded Addiction condition (8) ensures that the denominator of (B2) is 
negative. Then, the partial derivatives with respect to the four policy tools can be easily 
derived from (B2), confirming that the cost parameters ,  and α µ λ  have negative impacts on 
*n , while the media environment parameter ψ  has a positive one. 
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